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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN INDIANA
BY EDWIN BORCHARD*
I
On March 5, 1927, Indiana adopted the Uniform Act on
Declaratory Judgments., Since then this refoim in pro-
cedure has had in Indiana a somewhat checkeced career.
Beginning slowly to apply the statute, the Supreme Court
upheld its constitutionality by inference in 1930 in a case
brought by certain taxpayers against the State Board of Tax
Commissioners and the City of South Bend, alleging that a
statute conferring revisory taxing powers on the State Board
was unconstitutional.2  Constitutionality was squarely up-
held upon allegations of non-justiciability in 1935, when
the court upheld the propriety of an action for th e construc-
tion of a contract for the sale of stock and the application to
the purchase price of certain funds.' A few judges had
stumbled over this hurdle, believing the declaration of rights
to be an advisory opinion, a hypothetical case, or for other
reasons not to involve a justiciable controversy.
In 1935 the Supreme Court rendered an unfortunate
opinion in Brindley v. Meara' which gave the reform a set-
* Justus S. Hotchiss, Professor of Law, Yale University Law School.
1. Acts 1927, Ch. 81, p. 208.
2. Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930), 6 Ind.
L. J. 118, 40 Yale L. J. 129.
3. Rauh v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co., 207 Ind. 638, 194"N.E.
334 (1935), 10 Ind. L. J. 525.
4. 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 301 (1935); Borchard, An Indiana De-
claratory Judgment (1936) 11 Ind. L. J. 376. The Brindley view
was expressly repudiated in Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266
N.W. 921 (1936).
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back. In that case, in which members of the Advisory Board
of a town sought a declaratory judgment as to the construc-
tion of a certain statute, the court reached two unsustainable
conclusions: first, contrary to the words of the statute, a
dictum that a declaratory judgment was not an alternative
remedy, grantable even though other remedies might have
been sought, but exclusive, like an extraordinary remedy; and
second, that the reference to the possibility of getting "fur-
ther relief based on a declaratory judgment" meant further
declaratory relief.
The conclusions involved such serious misconstructions
of the statute that fortunately the errors were until lately
hardly repeated. After 1935 the declaratory action was ap-
plied in some sixty-five cases, and doubtless many more in
lower courts, until 1942 and 1943, when for some unexplain-
able reason, the court reverted to the discredited view of
Brindley v. Meara, and held that if in a particular case any
other remedy was available, the declaratory action should
be dismissed as inappropriate. This evinces a new hostility
to the declaratory action hardly evidenced in the seven years
after 1935 and not justified by the directly contrary pro-
visions of the governing statute. Of that statute the court
seems unfortunately to have made a curious analysis. Had it
inquired into the history of the doctrine in other states, it
would have found that only a trifling minority of question-
able cases have followed this late Indiana view.5 To analyze
the court's revived misconstruction and to pay tribute to the
progressive employment in Indiana of this simplified pro-
cedure down to that time, this article is submitted.
II
Types of Grievance Susceptible of Declaratory Relief
The declaratory judgment differs from other judgments
only in the fact that it is not followed by a coercive order
or decree. It merely declares the pre-existing rights of the
parties. But within that framework it permits the institu-
tion of a great many actions by parties heretofore incapable
of suing, such as debtors v. creditors, whereas it also permits
5. This might be compared with the equally unfortunate dictum in
a West Virginia case, Crank v. McLaughlin, 23 S.E. (2d) 56(W. Va. 1942), that unless a coercive remedy is available, the
declaration will not be issued.
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traditional parties to choose the mild remedy of a declara-
tory judgment, instead of the drastic remedy of coercion-
a mild remedy quite adequate where the defendant is respon-
sible, such as an insurance company, a municipality, a large
corporation. •
Roughly speaking, the declaratory judgment may be
brought in three types of cases: first, where another action
could also have been brought; the second and third, where
another action would not have been possible. The justifica-
tion for the first type of case is that the declaratory action
affords a less technical, speedier, cheaper and more civilized
joinder of issues, in types of cases heretofore associated with
hostile combat, the encrusted technicalities of special writs,
and irrevocably broken economic relations. The declaratory
action proceeds on the assumption that a mild remedy will
often satisfy, that responsible defendants do not need more
than a declaration of the law to obey it, and that coercive
relief under such circumstances is an expensive and usually
unnecessary remedy. The best evidence that the declaratory
action was expected to be employed in such cases is to be
found in the words of the statute itself, authorizirg the courts
to render declaratory judgments "whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed," that is, whether a coercive
remedy, like damages, injunction or specific performance 1)
is also claimed, 2) is not claimed and could not be claimed,
and 3) could be claimed but is not claimed. The unfor-
tunate view of the Indiana Supreme court in Berman v.
Druck,6 and Burke v. Gardner7 thus ignores the plain words
of the statute. In the Burke case, the plaintiff landowners
sued adjoining landowners for a declaration that a building
restriction, confining the neighborhood to residential houses,
was still valid. The defendants were apparently intending
to erect a church on land in a subdivision of the city of Elk-
hart. On the theory that the plaintiffs could have sought
an injunction-relief always speculative-the (ourt denied
the declaration, citing with approval Brindley v. Meara and
adding, without justification, that the court has consistently
followed it. Even if it were true that plaintiffs could -have
sought an injunction, this under the statute ws no reason
6. 41 N.E. (2d) 837, 839 (Ind. 1942), superseded and aff'd 47 N.E.(2d) 142 (1943).
7. 47 N.E. (2d) 148 (Ind. 1943).
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whatever for declining a declaration. Indeed, the declara-
tion is often asked in combination with an injunction, partly
because a declaration is likely to be more elaborate, and
partly to escape the dilemma that if an injunction is denied
on procedural grounds, the substantive rights of the parties
may remain undeclared. An injunction also requires, as a
rule, the posting of a bond and other technical conditions
with which the declaration dispenses.
A similarly unfortunate view was taken in Barnard v.
Kruzan.8 There the plaintiff taxpayer sued the city and
others for the construction of a will. Representing all tax-
payers, the plaintiff challenged the validity of a condition
in the will that the fund be held for accumulation of interest
and sums to be added by the city. He asked specifically that
the trust be declared terminated and that the trustee pay
over the fund to the city. The court concluded that this
asserted an immediate right to possession of the trust fund,
and that a demand had been made for termination of the
trust. This it held to be a coercive action, and hence not to
constitute the subject of a declaratory judgment. Under the
law of declaratory judgments this is an unjustifiable view.
In Thompson v. Travis9 the plaintiffs, acting for them-
selves and all members of the Plymouth Manufacturing Com-
pany, sued the partners and members of the Board of Control
of that company for a declaration that the Board of Control
was not authorized to pay unemployment compensation taxes
to the state, because plaintiffs were partners in the company
and not employees. The State Board of Review of the Un-
employment Compensation Division appeared specially and
filed a plea in abatement because the action sought to re-
strain governmental agencies from collecting the tax pro-
vided by statute. Although the lower court declared the
rights of the parties and enjoined the company Board of
Control from paying the tax, the Supreme Court ordered the
complainti dismissed for want of jurisdiction, not only be-
cause the state agency should have been made a party, but
because even if a party, the action for the collection of the tax
or to prevent its collection had matured and for that reason
8. 46 N.E. (2d) 238 (Ind. 1943). See also 44 N.E. (2d) 233 (Ind.
App. 1942).
9. 46 N.E. (2d) 598 (Ind. 1943). See also 220 Ind. 1, 39 N.E. (2d)
944 (1942).
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a declaration would not be issued. In this case Brindley v.
Meara was again invoked as authority.
In Pitzer v. City of East Chicago° the plaintiff firemen
sued the city and others for a declaration determining their
rights, statug and legal relations. They had been appointed
December 31, 1938, by the outgoing city adimnistration, ef-
fective January 1, 1939. But on that day a new city admin-
istration took office. When plaintiffs reported for duty the
new administration refused to recognize them as firemen on
the ground that the retiring board had no authority to ap-
point them. The Supreme Court again refused to render a
declaration on the alleged ground that the plaintiffs had an
action to require the city to recognize them as firemen, or
an action for salaries of which they had been deprived. The
court is quite wrong in suggesting that a declaratory judg-
ment is appropriate only where there are "ripening seeds"
of controversy which have not yet developed into a right of
action for executory relief;- that they might have to try
the action piecemeal, a dilemma hardly possible since the de-
claration of rights is res judicata and implementing coercive
relief can be obtained, if necessary, on mere motion. No new
trial is then possible. Only where new facts are presented
is a new trial required, as in Brindley v. Meara. The Indiana
court in the Pitzer case preferred to say that they would de-
termine the rights of the parties only in connection with an
action seeking executory relief. The Brindley, Thompson
and Burke cases are all cited, so that unless further study
is given to this question the court will have entrenched it-
self in an error depriving the people of Indiana of a useful
remedy which undoubtedly the legislature, looking at the
experience of many other states, had intended Indiana to
enjoy. In the cases to be discussed below, it will appear
that, with one exception, the Supreme Court had not in the
seven years between 1935 and 1942 declined jurisdiction on
the erroneous ground that another remedy was available.
The second type of case in which the declaratory action
has proved of value, brings into issue the construction of a
written instrument prior to the breach. In theEe cases ad-
judication had heretofore been predicated on prior violence
10. 51 N.E. (2d) 479 (Ind. 1943).
11. Citing Owen v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Bldg. Co., 99 Ind. App.
365, 189 N.E. 173 (1934).
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or destruction of the status quo. This is no longer necessary.
Section 2 of the Uniform Act provides generally for the con-
struction of written instruments, public and private, includ-
ing statutes, ordinances and other documents, and Section 3
specifically provides that contracts may be construed before
or after their breach, thus presenting an additional negative
answer to the court's view in the Burke and other cases.
This provision for adjudication before breach rests on the
assumption that most people observe the law if they can obtain
al authoriative interpretation or construction of their ob-
ligations, and that to obtain such adjudication it is not neces-
sary to destroy economic and social relations, as is now gen-
erally the case. Contracts, such as long-term leases, affected
as never before by new events, such as legislation, change of
circumstances or party acts, may thus be kept alive while in
litigation, instead of requiring a purported breach or repu-
diation as a condition of judicial cognizance. As contrasted
with the Burke case, covenantors, bound by a deed contain-
ing building restrictions, often sue their covenantees for a
declaration that the covenant has become obsolete by the
passage of time, and that they are privileged to tear down
the old building and erect a new one, thus obtaining an ad-
judication of their rights before demolishing or injuring
the building and incurring the risks attached thereto. As
Butler, J. remarked in Terrace v. Thompson, construing a
penal statute :12
"They are not obliged to take risk of prosecution, fines
and imprisonment and loss of property, in order to secure
an adjudication of their rights."
The third type of issue arises in cases where a party
has been challenged, threatened or endangered in the enjoy-
ment of what he claims to be his rights. Thereupon he is
enabled to initiate the proceedings against his tormentor or
an opponent invoking a challenging event or document and
remove the cloud by an authoritative determination of the
plaintiff's legal right, privilege and immunity and the defend-
ant's absence of right, duty or disability.23  Corresponding
to an ancient remedy of the Roman law as reflected in the
ceremony of matrimony, it compels the challenger to come
12. 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923).
13. This was the basis of Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227 (1937), a leading case.
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forward, prove his claim, or ever thereafter remain silent.
Thrown into jeopardy and danger by the threat or attack,
the party charged has a legal interest in removing the cloud
on his rights. This type of case, sometimes conveniently
called the negative form of declaratory judgment, although
expressible in affirmative terms, has attracted the widest
attention because of the novelty of the fact situations pre-
sented to the courts. This type of claim may also involve
the construction of a written instrument under type 2. Both
types are designed to remove uncertainty and doubt from
disputed legal relations and, by clarifying anO stabilizing
them, to perform the valuable social function of promoting
security.
III
Brindley v. Meara-A Regrettable Mistake
Brindley v. Meara, decided in 1935, was the second of
two appearances before the Supreme Court of the members
of the Advisory Board of North Township, Lake County.
They had already successfully brought an action for a de-
claratory judgment construing a statute which determined
that they, and not the defendant township trustee, had the
power to select the persons who were to be employed by the
trustee as investigators or assistants in discharging duties
concerning the relief of the poor.'4 Later on, the trustee,
apparently, annoyed the Advisory Board by publishing
certain articles attacking their integrity and imps rtiality, and
threatened to harass the Board in the performance of their
duties. The Board thereupon petitioned the court "as fur-
ther relief" for an order enjoining the trustee from "inter-
fering [with] harassing and annoying . . . your petition-
ers."
The relief was sought under Section 8 of the Uniform
Act, which provides that, on motion with notice, the court
may grant "further relief based on a declaratory judgment."
The petitioners gave no notice, says Judge Fansler, and of
course the relief sought was not that specific ancillary judg-
ment which would carry the declaration, if resisted; into
coercive effect. The "further relief" was therefore properly
denied. But Judge Fansler took occasion to deliver, as
14. Meara, as Trustee, et al. v. Brindley et al., 207 Ind. 657, 194
N.E. 351 (1935).
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dictum, a disquisition on the function of the declaratory
judgment in relation to executory judgments which is unique
in judicial annals as a misconstruction of the Act. Realizing
the importance of the opinion in its destructive possibilities,
the writer ventured to criticize it in an article published
in this Journal in 1936,15 where a detailed analysis will be
found.
Judges are busy men and can not always take the time
for a studied investigation of procedural reforms. They also
labor under a very old judicial prejudice that for every cause
of action there is only one writ. The fact that a petitioner
might be given by legislation a choice of two or even more
alternative remedies strikes many judges as unusual and er-
roneous. The new Federal Rules are progressive in that they
provide :16
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
Judge Fansler, while endeavoring to acquaint himself with
the history of this procedure, which has a background of cen-
turies, nevertheless came to conclusions which distort the
entire meaning and purpose of the Act. Perhaps his major
premise accounts for many of the minor errors. He concluded
that if the Declaratory Judgments Act made any reference
to executory relief-already authorized in previous statutes
and common law-the body of the Act would be broader than
its title and it would therefore be unconstitutional. That
executory relief might have to be mentioned in order to coor-
dinate declaratory relief seems to have been ignored. This led
him mistakenly to conclude that "further relief" must mean
"further declaratory relief." Since the Act states that it
is "remedial" and therefore enjoins on the courts a liberal
construction, Judge Fansler concludes that it must be con-
sidered to fill a gap or supply defects, and since executory
remedies are already available where the injury has occurred,
the declaration in such cases would fill no gap or supply de-
fects. Hence, in spite of plain words, it could only be used,
he said, where no other remedy was available. Thus he easily
drifted into the conclusion that Section 3 of the Act, which
15. An Indiana Declaratory Judgment, 11 Ind, L. J. 376.
16. Rule 54 a.
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permits a declaration of rights either before or cfter breach
of a contract, could not be given effect. The authorization
to give declarations "whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed," already commented upon, is read es if it said
"provided no executory relief is obtainable," the precise op-
posite of what it actually says and as the courts with almost
complete unanimity have construed it. Giving the Act an
exceedingly narrow and not sustainable construction, the
learned judge makes the following statement, which has been
invoked by the Indiana courts in recent cases with the effect
of practically repealing the Declaratory Judgments Act: 1'
The Supreme Courts of Michigan and Pennsylvania have
held, concerning statutes substantially identical with ours,
that the proceeding is not intended as a substitute or alterna-
tive for the common-law actions; that relief is nt proper
under the statute where another established remedy is avail-
able; that any other interpretation would mean the practical
abolition of all established forms of action at law and pro-
ceedings in equity, which was not intended by the Enactment,
and that the clause, "whether or not further relief i3 or could
be claimed," was not intended to mean that proceedings by
declaratory judgment are available whenever any controversy
exists, but rather that such relief may be had even though
for complete relief other and additional remedies must later
be resorted to.
This statement is a prejudiced construction of an Act
intended to serve the people of Indiana. Analyzing the state-
ment, it may be said that practically every sentence in it is
vulnerable to attack. Judge Fead in Michigan, in the Ayres
and Siden cases cited in support, did say that the Act was
not a substitute for the common law actions. No one ever
said that it was, and since most litigants wish coercive relief
it could not possibly be. What Judge Fansler overlooked
was that (1) Justice Potter dissented vigorously in the Siden
case from Justice Fead's assumption, as he had, with the
approval of the entire country and finally of the Michigan
Supreme Court itself, in the Anway case ;"' (2) Judge Fead's
view has not been sustained by later cases in Michigan,
which consider the declaratory judgment as it literally pro-
vides, an alternative and not an extraordinary remedy; and
17. 209 Ind. at 152; quoted in Berman v. Druck, 41 N.F. (2d) at 839.
18. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N.W. 350(1919).
1944]
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(8) that when it was uttered it represented a trifling minori-
ty in the case law, a minority criticized as mistaken by the
very book which Judge Fansler consulted. Pennsylvania,
from a splendid beginning, did drift into the unhappy groove
which Judge Fansler presents, practically nullifying the Act.
At the time he probably did not know that Judge von Mosch-
zisker had an amendment to the Act introduced into the
legislature designed to bring the court back to a correct con-
struction, but some one in the legislature tacked an amend-
ment on the von Moschzisker amendment which is so doubt-
ful in meaning that the Pennsylvania court construed the
amendment as a justification for adhering to their strange
views.- Had Judge Fansler written a few years later he
might have cited Maryland, which indeed adopted the unsound
view that the declaration was to be used only when no other
remedy was available,20 in the face of a special clause in the
Maryland Act, borrowed from Federal Rule 57, providing
"nor shall the existence of another adequate remedy pre-
clude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is
appropriate."'1  The bulk of the courts and cases of the
country have not thus misconstrued the words and plain
meaning of the statute.
It is not true that "any other interpretation would mean
the practical abolition of all established forms of action at
law and proceedings in equity," a conclusion not conjectural
which an elementary knowledge of what the courts have done
in the last twenty-five years would have dissipated. As
already observed, most plaintiffs seek and need coercive
relief and will not consider declaratory relief as adequate.
Not one case in twenty or thirty is brought for declaratory
relief only. The fears which prompted the court's statement
are entirely unjustified by the facts.
The clause "whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed" means exactly what it says, namely, that a declara-
tory judgment may be sought whether coercive relief is also
claimed, is not claimed and could not be claimed, could be
19. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 318. The stulify-
ing Amendment to the original von Moschzisker Amendment has
recently been repealed. Laws 1943, no. 284, P.L. 23.
20. Caroline Street Permanent Building Ass'n v. Sohn, 178 Md. 434,
13 A. (2d) 616 (1940).
21. A criticism of the Maryland construction will be found in an
article by Richard W. Case in (1942) 6 Md. L. Rev. 221-238.
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claimed but is not claimed-the exact opposite of the court's
construction. It is available whenever any justiciable con-
troversy arises involving pre-existing rights, but should not
be issued if it will not settle the controversy.
The last- clause of the paragraph would seem uncon-
sciously to present a trick solution: if coercive relief is avail-
able no declaratory judgment may be obtained. This re-
quires an attorney to guess whether the court in its wisdom
will conclude, as in the Burke case, that petitioner might have
had an injunction now or later. If now, always a speculative
matter, he cannot get the declaratory judgment; if later, he
may. This obligation to guess whether the court will not
find another remedy available is not only contrary to the Act
but will discourage attorneys from using the Act. It is not
correct to say that the "ripening seeds" of a controversy
alone warrant a declaration. In the Pennsylvamia opinion
from which these words are taken, In re Kariher's Petition,2 2
Judge von Moschzisker remarked that there niust be the
ripening seeds of a controversy or a controversy.
This false construction would line up Indiana with Mary-
land against practically all the rest of the English-speaking
world, and would deprive the citizens of the state of a use-
ful remedy, as intended by the legislature. It gives a basis
to writers who attack the courts as inflexible and imper-
vious to procedural reforms even when commarded.
IV
Procedure
Before entering upon a discussion of the iules of sub-
stantive law, public and private, which the appellate courts
of Indiana have declared, certain procedural matters warrant
mention.
Section 1 of the Uniform Acts reads: "Coui-ts of record
within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to de-
clare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed." The court therefore
held, in an original action brought against the state in the Su-
preme Court by a poor person for a declaration determining
the validity of certain statutes, 23 that the original jurisdiction
22. 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
23. Spenee v. State, 48 N.E. (2d) 459 (Ind. 1943), application denied
319 U.S. 729, 63 S. Ct. 1160 (1943).
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of the court had not been enlarged by the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, following in this respect the corresponding view
of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.
It is a general common law rule that where an adminis-
trative remedy is provided, it must be exhausted before
judicial review may be demanded. For that reason the de-
claratory action of the Superintendent of Schools against
the School Board of the City of Lafayette for having been
discharged in violation of a written contract, was dismissed
because of the plaintiff's failure to appear in the proceedings
before the School Board.2 4
In Berman v. Druck the plaintiff claimed the right to
possession of certain stock certificates against the adminis-
trators of a certain estate. While refusing to order a trans-
fer of the certificates, asserting that the declaration would
end the controversy, the court curiously concludes that it
has no power to grant coercive relief in the same action,
citing in support the deplorable opinion in Brindley v. Meara.
Of course the -court could have granted both declaratory and
coercive relief in one action, since this was the purpose of
the words "whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed."
In the comparatively early case of State ex rel. Mayr,
Sec. of State v. Marion Circuit Court,25 the plaintiff sought
a writ of prohibition against the court's exercising jurisdic-
tion over a pending suit, and an injunction against the pub-
lication of a bill claimed by the City of Muncie never to have
been legally enacted. While the writ was denied, Judge
Treanor, dissenting with another judge, remarged that one
department may not be easily prohibited from interfering
with another, and the extraordinary remedies of injunction
and prohibition should be sparingly used. He added: "The
merits of the controversy could be tried out by use of the
declaratory judgment statute, admirably designed for such
a situation."
In Hoffman v. City of Rochester26 certain real estate
owners asked a declaration that the proceedings for the im-
provement of Jefferson Street were insufficient to charge
24. School City of Lafayette v. Highley, 213 Ind. 369, 12 N.E.(2d) 927 (1938).
25. 202 Ind. 501, 176 N.E. 626 (1931).
26. 209 Ind. 529, 198 N.E. 783 (1935).
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their property with an assessment therefor. Final contracts
had been let for the improvement on the day the complaint
was filed. Because the contractor and the othEr owners of
abutting property were not made parties, the court concluded
that the judgment would pass only on the regularity of the
procedure but could not award the recovery of assessments
or contractors' liens. Hence, in its discretion under Section
6, judgment was given for the defendant.
In Lambert v. Smith" the owner of property in the City
of Gary brought a declaratory action to review a prior judg-
ment sustaining an order of the State Fire Marshall directing
the destruction of the petitioner's house as a fire hazard, and
declaring the prior judgment void. Since no appeal lay from
that prior judgment, the court properly held th-.t a declara-
tory action could not lie to effect a collateral attack upon it,
even though the petitioner for the first time challenged the
constitutionality of the statute removing fire ha ards.
An interesting case on the unmentioned question of
joinder of parties defendant arose in Portage Township of
St. Joseph County v. Clinic, Inc.2  There the plaintiff hos-
pital and others sued three townships for a declaratory judg-
ment with respect to the liability for the care and treatment
of a minor pauper. The pauper and her parents, all on re-
lief, resided in Portage Township. The minor was injured
in an accident in Springfield Township. Since there was no
hospital there, she was taken to the plaintiff hospital in
Michigan Township, and treated there. A controversy arose
as to which township was by statute chargeable with the
expense of the treatment. The lower court held Portage
Township liable as the locus of residence, whereas the ap-
pellate court held Springfield Township, the place of the
accident, liable. Very properly, no question was raised as to
joinder of parties. This may be compared with the case
of Town of Manchester v. Town of Townshend, Westminster
and Londonberry,21 where the plainiff town alleged that a
certain pauper whom it had currently supported was in fact
resident or domiciled for three years in one or other of the
defendant towns or communities, one of which was under
a statutory duty to bear the costs of relief and reimburse the
27. 216 Ind. 226, 23 N.E. (2d) 430 (1939), 15 Ind. L. J. 320.
28. 109 Ind. App. 365, 33 N.E. (2d) 786 (1941).
29. 109 Vt. 65, 192 AtI. 22 (1937).
1944]
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plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Vermont felt that there
had been an improper joinder of parties defendant, that
there was no community of interest in questions of law and
fact as required in equity pleading, and that hence separate
actions would have to be brought against each of the three
towns. This was unfortunate, and Chief Justice Powers ap-
propriately dissented. There are numerous cases of this type.
V
Private Substantive Rights
Status is one of the rights most commonly determined
by declaratory action. The status of husband and wife,
parent and child, member, partner, or other legal relation,
not only frequently determines consequent personal and prop-
erty rights, but itself involves a determination of the validity
of a marriage, divorce, agreement, or other operative docu-
ment or transaction. Indiana has few such cases. In one,
Bowser v. Tobin,3° the plaintiff brought an unusual action,
seeking to have her status declared as the heir of the de-
ceased, and the invalidity of a judgment of divorce obtained
from her by the deceased twenty-eight years before, asserting
fraud in its procurement. The court properly denied the
declaration on the ground that its purpose was not to declare
a new legal status but one already in existence, that by this
action one could not set aside a prior decree of divorce. The
court went further, unnecessarily, and declared there was
insufficient evidence of fraud. The plaintiff did not correct-
ly understand the limitations on the use of a declaratory
action.
Contracts. Some unique fact situations have been the
subject of declaratory action in Indiana. They involve main-
ly the construction of a contract before breach, to determine
the rights of the respective parties, thus avoiding the neces-
sity for severing economic relations or for hostility. Several
of these actions were designed to avoid the plaintiff's peril
or to establish his security against the defendant.
In one case 31 one brother sued the other as owners of
adjoining real estate for a declaration of the rights and
status of the parties under their deceased father's agreement
30. 215 Ind. 99, 18 N.E. (2d) 773 (1939).
31. Retter v. Retter, 110 Ind. App. 659, 40 N.E. (2d) 385 (1942).
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with his neighbor and under the father's will. It was appar-
ently understood that the predecessor owners would jointly
erect a boundary fence between the two farms, maintained
by the brothers until 1940. On that date one of the brothers,
a life tenant, -asserted that there was no evidencE of division
of the fence by agreement. The adjoining brother, owner
of the fee, naming his brother's two sons as pa ties defend-
ant, successfully contended that there was an agreement for
the division of the boundary line fence and for its mainte-
nance.
In Hamilton v. Meiks32 the plaintiff's demand involved
the construction of a contract of guaranty, appearing on cer-
tain preferred stock of the J. B. Hamilton Fur-niture Com-
pany which had been issued to the defendants in return for
their assets in a certain company. In 1930 plaintiff had
assigned her property in trust to the defendants and to Shelby
National Bank for the benefit of creditors. She had re-
served for herself certain property as a residEnce and an
annual income of $6,000. The question arose as to what was
the substance of her guaranty, whether in reserving $6,000
per year out of the "proceeds," whether "proceeds" included
only income from her assets or proceeds from the sale of the
principal. In holding that it was the latter, the court con-
strued the extent of her guaranty. She desired to escape the
peril attached to an unknown liability, and wished to limit
it by construing her agreement. No other action would pre-
sumably have been available to her.
A somewhat related type of action arose in South Bend
State Bank v. Department of Financial Institw'ions et al.33
The contract in issue was one of liquidation. By it the plain-
tiff bank had agreed with two defendant banks to transfer
to them all its assets, in return for which the defendant banks
assumed the obligation to pay the plaintiff's debts. Plaintiff
also agreed to hold the defendants harmless against loss,
and to that end gave defendants its real estate in trust,
agreeing to hold its own stockholders to their statutory
liability. Defendants were given three years w-ithin which
to liquidate the plaintiff's banking business. Unforunately,
the depression deepened so that the defendant banks were
32. 210 Ind. 610, 4 N.E. (2d) 536 (1936), rev'g 198 N.E. 833 (Ind.
App. 1935).
33. 213 Ind. 396, 11 N.E. (2d) 689 (1938).
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forced to the wall, one being taken over by the banking com-
missioner, the other consolidated with another bank. The
liquidation of plaintiff's assets continued, but now at great
sacrifice in price. The plaintiff thereupon asked for a de-
claratory judgment on the basis of the original contract,
alleging that the original contract was an outright sale, and
that plaintiff had the right to the value of its assets as of
that date. The court held the contract was not one of out-
right sale. The peril to which the plaintiff was exposed and
which he sought to avoid by a stabilizing judgment could
thus not be averted.
In Cline v. Union Trust Co.'4 the plaintiff also sought
to establish the nature of his contract and to avoid the dfs-
sipation of his funds. He sued the trust company for a dec-
laration that a deposit of $40,000 made to guarantee Arthur
L. Hubbard as surety on an appeal bond, was in fact a spe-
cial account and therefore entitled to preferential treatment
after the bank went into liquidation. The contract did state
that the account was to be kept separate and to bear 4%
interest, to be disposed of in a certain way only. The bank
placed the funds in its general account. The surety, Hubbard,
died insolvent in April 1931. In June the bank went into
liquidation, whereupon the plaintiff drew a new bond, de-
manding the return of the deposited money, which was re-
fused. Thereupon he sued. The court held that the account
was not a special account entitled to preferential treatment.
No question of alternative remedy was raised.
A somewhat similar claim for a declaration of prefer-
ential treatment was brought in McErlain v. Taylor, 5 in
which a creditor, claiming as a "manual or mechanical la-
borer," sued for the full amount due in an insolvency. The
defendant denied the constitutionality of the statute accord-
ing the preference, but was defeated.
In Rauh v. Fletcher Saving and Trust Co.,88 one of the
two cases in which the Indiana Declaratory Judgments Act
was held constitutional in all respects, the appellant had agreed
to sell and the appellee's decedent had agreed to buy certain
shares of stock. A question arose as to the correct construc-
tion of the contract, and the application to the purchase price
34. 99 Ind. App. 296, 189 N.E. 643 (1934).
35. 207 Ind. 240, 192 N.E. 260 (1934).
36. 207 Ind. 638, 194 N.E. 334 (1935).
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of certain salaries received by Rauh and by Kahn, the trust-
tee's deceased. A declaratory action was brought. This was
preferable to a drastic action for breach of contract after
one or the other party had acted on his own interpretation of
his rights. As Senator Walsh of Montana onca remarked,
if a will can be construed, why not a contract?
An interesting construction of a contract involving the
determination of a question of fact occurred in Rosenbaum
Brothers v. Nowak Milling Corporation," recertly decided.
In that case, the plaintiff was the purchaser of a milling
business and sued the seller for a declaratory judgment con-
struing the contract. The plaintiff had agreed to buy the
business, the merchandise on hand and certain trade marks
for a consideration consisting of cash and certain royalties.
The contract provided that if the seller engaged in business
in competition with the plaintiff during the first three years
following a joint inventory, the plaintiff would not be obliged
to pay any further royalties. The defendant had signified
its intention to enter in competition before the expiration of
the three-year period. The plaintiff obtained an injunction
restraining such competition, and then asked a declaratory
adjudication that the plaintiff was under no duty to pay any
further royalties. All royalties theretofore due had been
paid to the defendant. After contest arose, royalties were
paid into court. After the trial and before the appeal, an
additonal issue arose by which the defendant asked for a
declaration that interest was due on the royalties paid into
court. The payment into court and the request for a declara-
tion were due to the plaintiff's desire not to be in default
on what would be a profitable contract. Holding that the
defendant was not competing but had only indicated its
intention to compete, the Supreme Court renderEd judgment
for the defendant.
In Kipfer v. Kipfer38 the plaintiff wished to construe
three contracts as if they were one. He had entered into
three contracts'with his mother and father over a period of
fourteen years. The defendant executor of the Estate of the
plaintiff's mother and father denied that the second contract
was valid, claiming that the signatures were not genuine.
37. 51 N.E. (2d) 623 (Ind. 1943).
38. 213 Ind. 321, 12 N.E. (2d) 507 (1988).
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The Supreme Court so found, again deciding an issue of fact,
"and held for the defendant.
In Poston v. Taylor,39 the plaintiff preferred stockholder
brought a suit against other stockholders claiming that their
plan for the liquidation of the company and the distribution
of the stock was illegal under the preferred stock agreement.
He contested an arrangement arrived at by a majority of
75% of the present stockholders. Construing the contract,
the court held the plaintiff's case without merit.
In Blume v. Kruckeberg4° the plaintiff executor of an
estate sued the defendant, son of the testator, to recover on
a promissory note executed by the defendant in the testator's
favor. The defendant thereupon filed a cross-complaint,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the liability on the note
had been discharged by provisions of the testator's will. A
demurrer to defendant's answer and cross-complaint below
was sustained by the lower court but reversed by the Su-
preme Court. The decision involved the construction of the
note, the discharge and the will.
In School City of Lafayette v. Highley41 the plaintiff
superintendent of schools of the City of Lafayette sued the
school board for a declaration that he had been improperly
discharged, in violation of a written contract. Reference
will be made hereafter under the head of Administrative Law
to two cases in which the scope or validity of public contracts
was construed at the initiative of a city or taxpayer.
In the somewhat complicated case of City National Bank
& Trust Co. of South Bend v. American National Bank,42
the American Bank, trustee of one fund, sued the City Bank,
trustee of another fund, in quasi-contract, for a declaration
that it was entitled to be reimbursed for the attorney's fees
which it had incurred and which redounded partially to the
benefit of the defendant trustee. The court granted the
petition for a declaration, apparently not concerning itself
with the fact that another form of action might have been
brought.
Leases. The reciprocal rights and obligations of lessor
39. 216 Ind. 359, 24 N.E. (2d) 31 (1939).
40. 44 N.E. (2d) 1010 (Ind. 1942).
41. 213 Ind. 369, 12 N.E. (2d) 927 (1938).
42. 217 Ind. 305, 24 N.E. (2d) 558 (1940), dissenting opinion 217
Ind. 312, 27 N.E. (2d) 764 (1940).
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and lessee often need construction during the life of the lease.
Instead of requiring, as at common law, that one party or
the other undertake or purport to break the lease and then
on suit discover whether his interpretation was or was not
correct, the declaratory judgment enables the issue to be de-
termined without breach of the lease. No leap in the dark
is required. The value of this procedure is illustrated in
three Indiana cases.
In Owen v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Building Co.4 the
plaintiff lessee asked a declaration of its duties as to the pay-
ment of taxes under the lease. In 1912 defendant had leased
the property to Fletcher and Metzger for ninety-nine years.
They assigned their interest to the plaintiff, and in 1919
plaintiff sublet the premises for a period of fifteen years.
The lease stated that the lessee was to pay city, state and
federal taxes on the property, including those which might
be assessed on the lessor's right to receive rent. After 1913
there arose a dispute as to the duty to pay the federal income
tax, the court holding that of course there was a justiciable
controversy and rendering judgment for the plaintiff's con-
struction.
Cassidy v. Montgomery Ward & Co.44 involved the con-
struction of a clause in a lease. Plaintiff had leased to the
defendant the first floor and most of the basement, reserving
the second floor to himself. But it was provided that the
lessee could take this floor under a certain procedure, by
which the rental was to be fixed by arbitrators if the parties
could not agree. About a year later the defendant sought
to exercise the privilege. The plaintiff thereupon claimed
it bad for uncertainty and want of mutuality. The case
turned on the meaning of the word "election" and the effect
of the clause giving the lessee the right to claim it after an
appraiser's report. The defendant cross-claimed for im-
mediate possession. The court held the lease valid and gave
defendant possession. No doubt was expressed as to the
propriety of the action.
In New Hdrnony Realty Corp. v. Superior Oil Co.45 the
oil company sued the realty corporation for a declaration of
its rights under a lease. The facts were agreed. On June
43. 99 Ind. App. 365, 189 N.E. 173 (1934).
44. 216 Ind. 490, 25 N.E. (2d) 235 (1940).
45. 108 Ind. App. 668, 31 N.E. (2d) 673 (1941).
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18, 1938, the defendant leased to the plaintiff certain land for
the purpose of drilling for oil and gas. In the event that no
well was commenced within one year the lease was to ter-
minate unless plaintiff paid defendant an additional rental
to cover the privilege of deferring operations. On March 9,
1939, the defendant served notice on the plaintiff that unless
a well were drilled on or before June 18, 1939, the defend-
ants would declare the lease forfeit and would proceed to quiet
title. The plaintiff had been making surveys on the land but
was not yet willing to spend the funds necessary for drilling.
The defendants thereupon contended that the contractual
obligation was to explore for oil and gas, an essential part
of the agreement, though implied, and that if not performed
within a reasonable time the omission would entitle defend-
ants to claim forfeiture. The trial court, affirmed on appeal,
declared that the plaintiff had complied with all its obliga-
tions under the lease, and that the lease should be deemed
continued on payment of additional rental as provided in its
terms.
Trusts. It happens frequently that trust deeds require
construction, as in the case of other contracts. In the inter-
esting case of Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,"6
a beneficiary life tenant sued the trustee of a trust estate
for a declaration that certain dividends accruing to the es-
tate were in fact the property of the plaintiff and not that
of the estate. This involved the construction of the trust
deed. The court held the action not to be a collateral attack
upon the judgment approving the trustee's act, but an inde-
pendent action for the construction of the trust and the settle-
ment.
In Novak v. Nowak4 7 a plaintiff home owner, unable to
read English, sued his sons to have his own conveyance of
realty to one son declared fraudulent and void, and to pro-
cure a reconveyance of the property to himself. The plaintiff
had understood that the property was to be reconveyed to
him, a reconveyance which the son refused, later convey-
ing the property to his brother, who knew all the facts.
The sons contended that the plaintiff's conveyance was made
for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, that the deed
was fraudulent, and that since both parties were in pari
46. 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324 (1935).
47. 216 Ind. 673, 25 N.E. (2d) 993 (1940).
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delicto, the deed was valid between them. The trial court,
affirmed on the merits, granted judgment for the plaintiff.
Insurance. Insurance companies have derived great
benefit from the declaratory judgment, since they may, prior
to, simultanebusly with or subsequent to a tort action brought
by the injured person against their assured, sue independ-
ently for a declaration that they are under no contractual
duty to defend the action or that their liability for a judg-
ment is limited, a determination often vital als) to the in-
jured party. Insurance cases have, however, been rare in
Indiana. Werner v. State Life Insurance Co.48 was an action
in which the beneficiaries of two life insurance policies sued
for double indemnity on the ground that their insured had
died as a result of gun shot wounds received when his shop
was held up. The policy was incontestable after one year.
The company contended that the cause of action was within
the exception of "murder or suicide" contained in the policy.
The case is notable only because Justice Kime, in his dissent,
objecting to the company's having been allowed, to contest,
pointed out that the Declaratory Judgments Act had been
passed four years before this policy was issued, and that the
insurer had had a chance to have such ambiguous phrases
construed, but had preferred to let them stand.
Wills. Wills and clauses of wills are frequently construed
by declaration at the initiative of a beneficiary, the executor,
or a public official. The cases are usually complicated and
admit of an action for the construction of a will, as Justice
Swaim stated in the case of Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Elston
Bank & Trust Co.4 1 In that case, the executor sued the trus-
tee and others for a declaration as to the proper distribution
of the assets of an estate under his control, and for a declara-
tion of his own duties in the premises. In Szzdkowska v.
Werwinski" the executor of a will sued the mother (legatee)
of the decedent and others to determine who was the dis-
puted beneficiary of a certain bequest contained in one item
of the will. This also was a determination of fait.
In Husted v. Sweeney" the trustee under the will sued
the beneficiaries of the trust for a declaration of his pbwer
48. 104 Ind. App. 27, 7 N.E. (2d) 209 (1937).
49. 216 Ind. 596, 25 N.E. (2d) 626 (1940).
50. 109 Ind. App. 511, 36 N.E. (2d) 948 (1941).
51. 48 N.E. (2d) 1004 (Ind. App. 1943).
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to pay certain claims made by beneficiaries to cover their
expenses, and a declaration whether this could be taken out
of principal or not. Judge Royse claimed that the benefici-
aries were the only proper parties for a determination of the
issues raised, because only their rights and interests could
or would be affected by the court's decision. He said they
Would have had the right to file pleadings against each other,
and added that Section 4 of the Declaratory Judgments Act,
dealing with executors of estates, did not contemplate coercive
judgments, citing the unfortunate case of Brindley v. Meara.
Of course the Declaratory Judgments Act contemplated that
coercive judgments might be rendered in combination with
declarations or to implement declarations if necessary, but
did not need to authorize them since they were authorized
under other provisions of the code.
In Hall v. Fivecoat52 the plaintiff cousin of deceased sued
for a declaration that she and five other first cousins were
the next of kin and heirs of deceased and entitled exclusively
to inherit, against the claim of one of the defendants that
he was the acknowledged illegitimate son of one of the sons
of the deceased, entitled on his behalf to claim the entire
estate. On demurrer to the cross-complaint for a declaration
of ownership, the trial court, affirmed on appeal, gave judg-
ment for the plaintiffs.
Title to property. The disputed title to property is one
of the common issues determined by declaration. The rights
claimed may find their source in a contract, deed, will or
other instrument. We have just seen that the conflicting
claims to property in an estate may be presented in the form
of an action for a declaration construing a will. In Zonker
v. Zonker5- the disputed claims between the widow and chil-
dren of one marriage and the widow's child of another mar-
riage found their source in an antenuptial agreement, which
required construction.
In Weppler v. Hoffine 4 the administrator of one of the
eight children of Adam Weppler asked for a construction of
the will, determining the type of estate in the realty which
his decedent's widow had received, on the decedent's quit-
52. 110 Ind. App. 704, 38 N.E. (2d) 905 (1942).
53. 102 Ind. App. 631, 4 N.E. (2d) 593 (1936).
54. 218 Ind. 31, 29 N.E. (2d) 204 (1940), rehearing denied 218 Ind.
35, 30 N.E. (2d) 549 (1940).
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claim of his interest in Adam Weppler's estate to the dece-
dent's widow. Holding that the decedent had divested him-
self of all interest by the quitclaim deed, Judge Shake re-
versed the judgment below "with directions to restate the
conclusions of law to the effect that appellee a6ministrator
has no interest in the real estate described in the complaint
VI
Public Law
Statutes and Ordinances. By Section 2 of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, any person interested under a
written instrument, including "statute" or "mur icipal ordi-
nance," may have determined any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument and obtain a declara-
tion of rights thereunder. Indiana has had a representative
number of cases involving various aspects of the_ validity or
construction of statutes and ordinances, including specific
powers exercised under them. These actions involve both the
formal validity of statutes or ordinances, instituted usually
on the initiative of public officials, or their subtantive va-
lidity-generally, but not exclusively, placed in issue by an
aggrieved citizen.
In Ettinger v. Studevent 5 a candidate for public office
sued the County Elections Commissioner for a declaratory
judgment that a 1941 statute regulating elections was un-
constitutional because it had excepted the city of Indianapolis
from its terms, whereas it had repealed a 1933 statute which
did regulate such elections. In granting a de flaration as
sought, the court denied in a parallel consolidate6 case an in-
junction against holding an election. Had the latter case
been instituted alone, the injunction might have been dis-
solved on procedural grounds, leaving untouched the sub-
stantive issue.
In Tucker v. Muesing56 the Secretary of State, harassed
by conflicting claims, sued businessmen for a declaratory
judgment as to the validity of a 1941 statute governing the
licensing and fees payable by the owners of motor vehicles
for hire. By the title of the Act it purported to repeal a
55. Consolidated with Hole v. Dice, 219 Ind. 406, 38 N.E. (2d) 1000
(1942).
56. 219 Ind. 527, 39 N.E. (2d) 738 (1942).
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1937 statute, which in turn had repealed a 1933 statute. But
Section 1 of the 1941 Act purported to amend a section only
of the 1937 Act, a fact not indicated in the title, as was
thought necessary under the Constitution. The Secretary
contended that even if Section 1 was invalid, the other sec-
tions stood. It was so held, reversing the trial court. In the
absence of the Declaratory Judgments Act, a more cumber-
some and drastic coercive remedy would have had to be
sought, either by suit of the Secretary of State or of the
affected vehicle owners.
In Perry Civil Township of Marion County v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co. 5 7 a public utility company sued the town-
ship and another for a declaration of the validity and con-
struction of a 1943 statute. The facts were stipulated. Prior
to 1933 the plaintiff's property was located in Decatur Town-
ship. In that year the County Commissioners changed the
boundary line between that township and the one adjoining,
Perry, so that plaintiff's property was then located in Perry.
In 1943 a statute was adopted providing that no township
was to be abolished or its boundary line changed without a
petition of a majority of the freeholders in the township
affected, and that in the case of townships containing a city
of 300,000 or more, where boundary lines had been changed
without a prior petition, the old boundary lines were to be
restored. The plaintiff, not sure of its rights, asked, besides
a declaration on the question of validity, whether the proviso
was applicable to the boundary between Decatur and Perry
Townships, and, interested in tax liability, in which township
its property was located. The defendant township contended
that the whole statute was unconstitutional, since it under-
took to regulate township business. The trial court upheld
the plaintiff's contention, but was reversed by the Supreme
Court. Only by indirection could an issue have been framed
for a more drastic remedy. The determination of the location
of state boundaries by declaratory action is a common source
of litigation in the Supreme Court, both before and after
1934, the date of the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act.
In Conter, County Treasurer et al. v. Post,5s a city treas-
57. 51 N.E. (2d) 371 (Ind. 1943).
58. 207 Ind. 615, 194 N.E. 153 (1935). The first Brindley case, 207
Ind. 657, 194 N.E. 351 (1935), presented' an issue between two
public officers as to the plaintiff's statutory powers.
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urer sued a county treasurer for a declaration of the validity
of an Act of 1933 which provided- that certain offices in
cities of the second class were to be elective, omitting the
office of city treasurer. It transferred the dutiEs of the city
treasurer to-the county treasurer, without trarsferring the
office itself. The plaintiff, whose office was apparently
abolished, claimed that the Act was unconstitutional. It
was so held below, but was reversed on appeal. This was an
action between two public officers, involving the existence
of their office and a redistribution of their duties. Injunction
might have been tried, but this would have been rather
tenuous.
There are several Indiana cases in which the constitu-
tionality, construction or applicability of a statute or ordi-
nance is challenged by the victim of its impact. In City of
South Bend v. Marckle"' the plaintiff sought e declaration
that a zoning ordinance could not be validly applied to his
realty, so as to prevent its use as a filling statio:i. The stat-
ute afforded a procedure for changing regulations by the
vote of the owners of 50% of the frontage in th'e neighbor-
hood affected. Another statute allows an appeal to the Board
of Zoning Appeals, with certiorari. With neither procedure
had the plaintiff complied. Justice Shake, for the Supreme
Court, stated that since the whole ordinance was not attacked
as unconstitutional, an appeal to the Zoning Appeals Board
was the proper procedure, with the Board havirig discretion
to change the boundary for plaintiff's benefit. Since the
court below had declared the whole ordinance void and over-
ruled the city's demurrer, it was reversed, Justice Shake sug-
gesting that if a retrial took place it would be well to con-
sider whether a jury could sit in a declaratory action, and
if the constitutional issue could be submitted to them as a
question of fact. It is believed that on neither point should
there be much doubt, since Section 9 of the Uniform Act
specifically provides that
"when a proceeding under this Act involves the detexmination
of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in
the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined
59. 215 Ind. 74, 18 N.E. (2d) 764 (1939). See also Financial Aid
Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E. (2d) 472 (1939), where
petitioner challenged by declaration the constitutionality of the
Small Loans Act.
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in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is
pending."
In Local Union No. 26, National Brotherhood of Opera-
tive Potters v. City of Kokomo,60 the union, which had en-
gaged in a strike against a certain pottery company, sought
a declaration that the defendant city's anti-picketing ordi-
nance, enacted during the strike, was void as in conflict with
an earlier 1933 state statute which had purported to regulate
labor troubles. Chief Justice Tremain, directing that the
city's demurrer be overruled, sustained the propriety of a
declaration.
In Division of Labor of Department of Commerce and
Industries of Indiana v. Indianapolis News Publishing Co.61
the publishing company sued the Division for a declaration,
plus injunction, that a 1929 statute prohibiting minors from
working in gainful occupations during school hours, with cer-
tain exceptions, did not apply to newsboys under fourteen, to
whom plaintiff sold newspapers as distributors and carriers.
The trial court rendered an elaborate opinion sustaining the
plaintiff's contentions, together with an injunction against
enforcement. Even a 1941 statute affirming the validity of
such sales did not make the case moot. Had the regrettable
view expressed in the later Burke case or the Kroger Grocery
case, infra, prevailed, a declaration, a satisfactory and ade-
quate procedure, might after 1942 have been deemed im-
proper.
In Lutz v. Arnold62 the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought a
declaration that the General Intangible Tax Act of 1933 was
unconstitutional. He was the owner of a promissory note on
which he had obtained judgment, but could get no execution
on it unless he affixed certain stamps in accordance with the
Act. He challenged the Act rather than buy the stamps.
In Pavey v. Pavey6 3 the trustees of a police pension fund,
which by statute was to be supplemented under certain cir-
cumstances from taxes levied on real estate, sued the mayor
and other officials for a declaration as to the construction
of the statute and particularly when taxes should be levied
60. 211 Ind. 72, 5 N.E. (2d) 624 (1987).
61. 109 Ind. App. 88, 32 N.E. (2d) 722 (1941).
62. Consolidated with Hamer v. Wise, 208 Ind. 480, 193 N.E. 840
(1935).
63. 220 Ind. 289, 42 N.E. (2d) 30 (1942).
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and their amount, what should be considered "income" and
what funds should be invested. Administrative officers often
find the declaration an appropriate method of obtaining a
construction of their duties, before acting on their own inter-
pretation.
Administrative Law. With ever greater power vested
in administrative officers, both members of the affected
public and the officers themselves find occasion to question
their powers. This often involves the construction and in-
terpretation of statutes and ordinances. Since these become
only indirectly the subject of litigation, the issue3 are more
appropriately dealt with under the head of administrative
law.
It is common to claim by declaration exemption from
certain administrative regulations or license either because
they are alleged to be unauthorized by the governing statute
or because administrative discretion was improperly used
against the plaintiff.4 In one case a bank sued the mayor
and others to determine which of two rival groups of trustees
of a municipal water works had authority to draw checks
against an account in the bank's possession.65 The court goes
out of its way to reiterate the erroneous conclusion that the
declaratory judgment did not furnish an additioial remedy
where an adequate remedy previously existed, reviving by
name the Indiana blight of Brindley v. Meara.
In one case a plaintiff who had obtained judgment
against a township on certain promissory notes given for
highway advances, brought an action against the defendant
county commissioners and other public officials to determine
their duties in paying highway debts, what tax funds should
be used to pay the judgment, and whether a certain claim
of a third person should be allowed out of one of these funds.68
64. Bennett v. Indiana State Board of Registration and Examination
in Optometry, 211 Ind. 678, 7 N.E. (2d) 977 (1937) (that regu-
lations of Optometry Board limiting plaintiff's employment were
void); Stiver v. Mayhew, 107 Ind. App. 704, 23 N.E. (2d) 614
(1939) (that haulers of limestone fertilizer to farmers were
exempt from -registering with the Public Service Commission);
Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 N E. (2d) 590(1939) (claims exemption from city license for pav.mbrokers be-
cause in alleged excess of state law).
65. Rogers v. Calumet National Bank, 213 Ind. 576, 12 N.E. (2d)
261 (1938). This revival is an exception to the gereral practice
between 1935 and 1942.
66. Board of Commissioners of Delaware County v. 'The Farmers
State Bank of Eaton, 104 Ind. App. 692, 10 N.E. (2d) 769 (1937).
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In another case, an interested taxpayer successfully sued the
city for a declaration that a depreciation reserve fund de-
rived from a municipal power plant must be spent in certain
ways only.67 In another case a sheriff sued the county com-
missioners to determine the exact mileage allowances to
which the statute entitled him.68 In an action by a theater
corporation against a city, the corporation challenged the
authority of a city fire marshall, contending unsuccessfully
that state control of fire hazards in theaters under an Act
of 1937 repealed by implication a city ordinance of 1925.69
In a recent action the city unsuccessfully sued a truck
company, assignee, for a declaration that under its contract
with the city the company was under a duty to extend its
garbage collection service to cover three new districts added
to the city since the contract was made.70 Since the com-
pany's refusal to make the desired collection constituted a
breach of contract, if the city's construction was correct, a
coercive action would have been ripe. It would have been a
denial of justice had the court relied on this alternative and
dismissed the declaratory action. Had a coercive action been
compelled, the chances are strong that the contract relations
would have been severed, a breach made unnecessary by the
declaratory action. In another recent case taxpayers sued a
publishing company, the higher of two bidders for a public
contract to supply stationery to certain county commissioners,
for a declaration that the commissioners had violated their
duty in accepting the higher bid and for a declaration that
the contract was illegal and void and should be set aside.71
The court seemed to raise no objection, very properly, at this
combination of prayers for relief.
Taxation. The incidence of taxation, now heavier than
ever, gives rise to numerous questions of construction, which
are most easily resolved by declaratory action, making dog-
matic assertion unnecessary but presenting to the court is-
67. Wilkins v. Leeds, 216 Ind. 508, 25 N.E. (2d) 442 (1940).
68. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Baker, 215 Ind.
163, 19 N.E. (2d) 250 (1939).
69. Hollywood Theatre Corp. v. City of Indianapolis, 218 Ind. 556,
34 N.E. (2d) 28 (1941).
70. Municipal City of South Bend v. Blue Lines, 219 Ind. 462, 38
N.E. (2d) 573 (1942), rehearing denied 219 Ind. 471, 39 N.E.(2d) 439 (1942).
71. Haywood Pub. Co. v. West, 110 Ind. App. 568, 39 N.E. (2d) 785(1942).
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sues of taxability, classification, statutory rate, exemption
and similar problems. Where these involve matters of ad-
ministrative discretion, of course, no court should interfere,
but where they involve questions of law, generally statutory
construction, .it seems unnecessary to require the exhaustion
of administrative remedies before bringing these legal issues
before the courts. A New York statute of 194372 requiring
the exhaustion of administrative remedies in every case over-
rules an important body of case law which had e:-pedited the
judicial determination of legal issues concerning taxation.
In Indiana a considerable number of tax cases have
arisen. Whether or not they were influenced by the import-
ant case of Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wal-
lace,7" holding that declaratory judgment lay, notwithstanding
the untried possibility of paying and suing for refund and a
statutory prohibition of injunction, it is hard to say. At all
events, several taxpayers have challenged the incidence of
taxation in their particular cases. In a recent case an ad-
ministratrix successfully claimed exemption from inheritance
tax under a 1937 statute which exempted estates against
which no proceeding to determine tax liabili.ty had been
brought for ten years after the death.74 In another case,
exemption from the gross income tax for non-profit organ-
izations was unsuccessfully claimed by a corporation dealing
in farm supplies which distributed its profits in the form of
common stock to its patrons and stockholders. 5 In another
case, the issuing corporation successfully brought an action
for a declaration that not the issuer but the owner of the
bonds only, was subject to the tax on the bonds, a tax on
intangiblesle
The classification for taxation under the gross income
tax of various types of transaction was adjudicated in Storen
v. Adams Mfg. Co.,77 a case which was carried to the United
72. Laws 1943, Ch. 424, p. 956.
73. 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
74. In re Batt's Estate: State v. Batt, 220 Ind. 193, 41 N.E. (2d)
365 (1942). .
75. Storen v. Jasper County Farm Bureau Co-operative Association,
103 Ind. App. 77, 2 N.E. (2d) 432 (1936).
76. It paid the tax, but sought a declaration that the money should
be returned to it as not due, Zoercher et al. v. Indiana Associated
Telephone Corp., 211 Ind. 447, 7 N.E. (2d) 282 (1937); ibid.
Zoercher et al. v. The Indianapolis Union Railway Co., 211 Ind.
703, 7 N.E. (2d) 289 (1937).
77. 212 Ind. 343, 7 N.E. (2d) 941 (1937).
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States Supreme Court.7 8 In Department of Treasury v. J. P.
Michael Co.,7 9 sales by a wholesale grocer to institutional
homes for consumption by inmates were deemed sales to
ultimate consumers and hence taxable at the highest rate.
The court held that the remedy under the Gross Income Tax
Act was additional and cumulative and not exclusive, and
that the taxpayer was therefore not precluded from suing
for a declaration of rights. In Clark's Laundry & Dry Clean-
ing Co. v. Department of the Treasury,0 the plaintiff unsuc-
cessfully claimed a low tax rate as preparing articles "for
use" as against a higher rate claimed by defendant from
"businesses not enumerated."
In one case a motorbus registration fee statute giving a
very low rate to busses operating wholly within "any" city
was construed to mean "one" city, as against the claim of a
bus line that it meant "all" cities."' The tax base, i.e., what
is gross income, and whether taxes were due on a tax, was
the issue raised in the recent case of Department of Treasury
v. Midwest Liquor Dealers.82 There wholesale liquor dealers
unsuccessfully contended that the stamp tax they were obliged
to affix to their products and for which they were reimbursed
by their customers was not a part of their gross income on
which taxes were payable. In a somewhat similar case four-
teen manufacturers and sellers of beer unsuccessfully sued
the Tax Division for a declaration that in filing gross income
tax returns they were privileged to deduct the amount of the
tax they were obliged to pay the federal Government under
the Revenue Act of 1918.3 In both these cases the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the trial court favorable to
the taxpayer.
Elections. In recent years the declaratory judgment
has come into ever greater use as a vehicle for raising ques-
tions as to the regularity of an election, the legality of its
conduct, the statutory qualification or eligibility of the can-
didate or nominee, the term for which he has been elected,
78. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
79. 105 Ind. App. 255, 11 N.E. (2d) 512 (1937).
80. 103 Ind. App. 359, 5 N.E. (2d) 683 (1937).
81. Chicago & Calumet District Transit Co. v. Mueller, 213 Ind.
530, 12 N.E. (2d) 247 (1938).
82. 48 N.E. (2d) 71 (Ind. 1943).
83. Gross Income Tax Division, Dept. of Treas. v. Indianapolis
Brewing Co., 108 Ind. App. 259, 25 N.E. (2d) 653 (1940).
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the duty to hold a new election, the computation of the bal-
lots, the right to vote, and other compliance with the election
laws. While Indiana does not exhibit as many of such cases
as do other states, there have nevertheless been some inter-
esting questions before the Indiana courts. These often turn
on the effect of a subsequent statute on an election carried
out under the old law. In Robinson v. Moser,84 an early case,
the petitioning prosecuting attorney, seeking to hold his
office, questioned the term of his office which had been placed
in doubt by a new statute subsequent to his election.
In Hay v. White 5 Hay became the acting mayor of Gary,
Indiana, and challenged the eligibility of both White and
Johnson, who were candidates to succeed him. Johnson won
the election, but Hay sought an injunction, the propriety of
which was the question on appeal. The injunc ion was re-
fused, but a declaration was issued which decicded the case.
This would not have been possible under the old procedure. 6
In Enmeier v. Blaize87 the clerk of a court sought a declara-
tion as to the effect of a new statute which placed in doubt
and issue the end of his term and the beginning of the term
of his successor, the defendant.
In the recent case of Harrell v. Sullivan88 taxpayers and
voters successfully sued the election officials for a declaration
that the statutory provision for registering voters was invalid.
Judge Shake remarked:
The rule that to enforce private rights the plaintiff must
show an injury to his person, property, or reputation is not
applicable to an action for the preservation of pullic or po-
litical rights.
Officers. Minor cases turn on the title of a public of-
ficer to a given salary or pension under the facts of his case.
In State ex rel. Clemens v. Kern8 9 the action was one for
mandamus to place relator's name on the pension rolls and
84. 203 Ind. 66, 179 N.E. 270 (1931).
85. 201 Ind. 425, 169 N.E. 332 (1930).
86. Cf. with Brindley v. Meara, supra note 4. Hasselbring v. Koepke,
263 Mich. 466, 248 N.W. 869 (1933), where the court, unable
to grant coercive relief, sua sponte issued a declaratory judgment.
This is approved practice. See comment under Federal Rule 57.
87. 203 Ind. 475, 181 N.E. 1 (1932).
88. 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E. (2d) 115 (1942), rehearhig denied 220
Ind. 125, 41 N.E. (2d) 354 (1942).
89. 215 Ind. 515, 20 N.E. (2d) 514 (1939), rehearing denied 215
Ind. 527, 21 N.E. (2d) 141 (1939).
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for the payment of a pension, since he claimed injury in the
line of duty, resulting in total disability. Judge Shake point-
ed out that the successful defendant wanted a ruling to guide
future policy on medical examinations, whereas defendant's
need was served by mere affirmance of the lower court's
rule. Expressing caution against the unnecessary pronounce-
ment of a decision as to future policy, Judge Shake stated
that the Declaratory Judgments Act "affords an appropriate
procedure for determining anticipated controversies of the
character presented by the cross-error."
In Ralston v. Ryan0 an office holder unsuccessfully sued
the County Auditor for a declaration that because he became
a licensed engineer during the term of his office, he became
entitled to a higher statutory salary than he was getting. In
another recent case9' a married woman teacher unsuccessfully
sought on the merits a declaration that she was a permanent
teacher in the defendant's township and entitled to a teach-
er's contract under the Tenure Act. The defense of laches
and contributory fault was sustained.
Civil Adjudication of "Penal" Legislation. Two cases
in Indiana illustrate the social advantage of a civil adjudica-
tion of the legality of a business practice as against the cruel
and inefficient method of a criminal prosecution. Dozens of
cases throughout the country have now recognized that a
business man, harassed by all types of police power legisla-
tion and administrative regulation may, after the state's
service of notice of illegality, not followed promptly by prose-
cution, seek to lift the suspended Sword of Damocles by him-
self initiating the action for a declaratory judgment as to
the validity, construction or applicability of the governmental
regulation. Because these regulations often have a penalty
attached, they do not necessarily make the delinquent or
uncertain business man a criminal, and it seems a rather
inefficient administration of justice, not guided by social
considerations, which would expose the jeopardized business
man to the ignominy of a criminal trial in order to establish
the validity, construction or applicability of a law of the
meaning of which both parties may be doubtful.
For example, in the recent New York case of Aerated
90. 217 Ind. 482, 29 N.E. (2d) 202 (1940).
91. Engel v. Mathley, 46 N.E. (2d) 831 (Ind. 1943), 48 N.E. (2d)
463 (1943).
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Products Company of Buffalo v. Godfrey, 2 the threatened
plaintiff corporation sued the State Commissioner of Health
for the determination of the classification of plaintiff's "In-
stant Whip" as a milk product or not. The product consisted
of cream and flavoring, packed with nitrous oxde in metal
containers. By opening a valve the cream, thus aerated,
came out of a spout in a whipped form. It was thus used
with ice cream products to look like whipped cream. The
defendant had contended that as a milk product it could be
sold only with the consent of local boards of health. Plain-
tiff claimed that it was a manufactured food product, to be
classified as "frozen desserts mix" under the Agricultural
and Markets Law, requiring therefore only state and not
particular local approval. The classification of the product
was a question for experts, not for juries. The trial court
held that it was not a milk product, but agreed with the
Appellate Division that submission to arrest and criminal
trial was not a remedy. The Appellate Division held it to
be a milk product. The Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing
with the trial court that it was not a milk product. The
case exemplifies the public advantage of trying such issues
on the civil side instead of compelling the District Attorney
to divert his attention to challenging business practices, try
them criminally before a jury of laymen in which he has the
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden
not required in declaratory actions.9 3
The superiority of a civil adjudication in sach cases is
illustrated by the recent Indiana case of Departirent of State
v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.9' The Kroger Company had
been selling certain vitamin tablets. The Board of Phar-
92. 290 N.Y. 92, 48 N.E. (2d) 275 (1943), rev'g 263 App. Div. 685,
35 N.Y.S. (2d) 124 (1942). See also Dill v. Hami-ton, 137 Neb.
723, 726, 291 N.W. 62, 64 (1940) (plaintiffs claimed the privi-
lege of conducting spiritualist seances, contending that they
did not constitute the prohibited public exhibition for gain.
Said the court, "Plaintiffs, seeking a declaratory judgment,
are not required in advance to violate a penal statute as a
condition of having it construed or its validity determined).
See also Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 567, 673, 179
At. 195, 197 (1935). An enforcing officer, in doubt as to
the meaning of a statute he must enforce, may also initiate
the action, Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 242 Ala. 379, 6 So.
(2d) 479 (1942).
93. Preponderance of evidence usually suffices.
94. 46 N.E. (2d) 237 (Ind. 1943), superseding 40 N.E. (2d) 375
(Ind. App. 1942). See also 41 N.E. (2d) 952 (1942).
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macy, adopting a prohibitory regulation, had contended in
reliance on a statute that these were chemicals or drugs,
poisonous in nature, constituting a "pharmaceutical specialty"
or a "prescription," and therefore salable only in drug stores.
The accused Kroger Company thereupon sued the Board of
Pharmacy for a declaratory judgment that the proper classi-
fication of the disputed article was an "accessory food" pro-
duct and hence not subject to the sales limitations demanded
by the Board of Pharmacy, whose regulation was void. The
issue was therefore whether the vitamin tablets constituted
foods or drugs. Two lower Indiana courts had, on Kroger's
petition, rendered a declaratory judgment in this most ap-
propriate case, raising no question as to the propriety of
such an adjudication. It had been made only after both
parties had called expert witnesses in their behalf who gave
testimony at considerable length.
When the case, however, was appealed to the Indiana
Supreme Court, it ordered a dismissal of the action for want
of jurisdiction on the ground that only a "criminal prosecu-
tion" could decide such an issue, denying in fact the juris-
diction of equity altogether, including power to issue an in-
junction "to restrain criminal prosecutions" or the "operation
of criminal statutes," on the alleged but unconvincing ground
that "no property rights are here involved." Even if it were
true that a declaratory judgment "would not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution," is it conceivable that a district attor-
ney would institute such a prosecution after a civil judgment
that the vitamin tablets were foods? Is a lay jury perfunc-
torily to ratify the testimony of the experts who alone are
qualified? Or is it to overrule the experts? It would be
hard to conceive of a more inefficient method of determining
such an issue than a criminal prosecution, probably against
the officers of the Kroger Grocery chain. To deny a declar-
ation in such a case on the ground that a criminal prosecu-
tion might have been brought comes close to a denial of jus-
tice. Without challenging the wisdom of the writing justice,
Shake, who has rendered many valuable opinions, it does seem
that the New York method exhibits a more enlightened social
policy.95
95. See New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators v. State Liquor
Authority, 285 N.Y. 272, 34 N.E. (2d) 316 (1941), rev'g 259
App. Div. 993, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 986 (1940), aff'g 173 Misc. 540,
18 N.Y.S. (2d) 188 (1939), in which the question was whether
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In Doyle, Excise Administrator, et al. v. Clark"9 the
plaintiffs, holders of beer dealers' permits, sued the Excise
Administrator and others for an injunction against the en-
forcement of provisions of a statute which purported to make
it unlawful for a beer dealer to sell malt beverages which
had been artificially cooled, and for a declaratory judgment
that such provisions are void. In holding the questioned
provisions constitutional, thus denying the injunction, Judge
Shake remarked that the Declaratory Judgments Act was
broad enough to admit such an action, but that if this was
not possible it must be because equity will not ordi-
narily enjoin the enforcement of a penal statute, a maxim
whose value depends upon a strict construction of the word
"penal." Applying the maxim broadly, however, he con-
cluded that the rule was subject to an exception in favor of
a declaratory proceeding to test the validity of a criminal
statute which affects one in his trade, business or occupation,
though such an action, he said, will not operate to stay the
enforcement of the statute during the pendency of the pro-
ceeding. The power of the Beverage Commis.sion to seize
and destroy the property condemned by the Act was a factor
in his mind in justifying the declaration of rights, although
he might not have granted the injunction even if he had held
the statute unconstitutional. While the theory that a declara-
tion may be granted as an exception to the maxim prohibit-
ing injunctions is somewhat unusual, it nevertheless recog-
nizes the value of determining substantive rights even where
an injunction is ungrantable. It indicates an approach quite
different from that evidenced in the Kroger Grocery case.
Perhaps a better criterion for distinction is between malum
in se and malum prohibitum. Only the former need be safe-
guarded against equitable adjudication, whether by injunc-
tion or declaration.97 There should be more geaeral recog-
nition of the fact that a business man has a right to obtain
a civil adjudication on the validity or meaning of a prohibited
the mixture of distilled spirits with alcohol constituted or not
rectification *ithin the licensing requirements of thE State Liquor
Authority, as the latter claimed and the plaintiffs denied.,
96. 220 Ind. 271, 41 N.E. (2d) 949 (1942), appeal dismissed 317
U.S. 590 (1942).
97. Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action(1943) 52 Yale L. J. 445.
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business practice,9 8 and not be exposed to a criminal prosecu-
tion as the only method of adjudication.
VII
Conclusion
In the states surrounding Indiana-Michigan, Ohio, Ken-
tucky and Illinois-the declaratory procedure has had a var-
ied career. Michigan, after the early misstep in the Anway
case, has since 1929 experienced a notable recovery and, per-
haps guided by the farsighted and fully vindicated under-
standing of Justice Sharpe, has given the Act a wide appli-
cation. Ohio, in which an intermediate court once held it
to be an extraordinary and not an alternative remedy, soon
corrected this aberration and now accords the Act full scope.
Kentucky applies the Act more extensively than does any
other state, and seems contented with this speedy and effi-
cient method of adjudication. Only Illinois, notwithstanding
numerous efforts, has failed to enact a Declaratory Judg-
ments Act.9 9 Over the country it has been applied in more
than 3,000 cases, state and federal, and has given sufficient
satisfaction to warrant extension, not limitation, of its
scope. 00
The restrictions recently imposed by the Indiana Su-
preme Court seem to reflect an excessive inflexibility in
regarding procedure as an end in itself instead of a means
to an end. Many lawyers have unconsciously considered the
technicalities of procedure as of the essence of law, and be-
98. What was said in State ex rel. Egan v. Superior Court of Lake
County, 211 Ind. 303, 6 N.E. (2d) 945 (1937), a bill to en-join a criminal prosecution of a dog race track, followed by
the prosecuting attorney's writ of prohibition against applica-
tion of the injunction and the dictum that the declaratory judg-
ment was not broad enough to permit the validity of the plan
of operation to be determined in advance, is not deemed suf-
ficiently relevant to this section to warrant discussion here. Cf.
Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E. (2d) 814 (1937), Bor-
chard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 1032.
99. In Illinois the Civil Practice Act of 1934 contained a section
authorizing the procedure; on the objection of a prominent
legislator it was withdrawn. At the last session a well-drafted
bill passed the Senate by an overwhelming majority, but the
Speaker of the House refused to let it come to a vote. Illinois
is perhaps the most important state having no statute. The
others that are out of the fold are Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi and Oklahoma.
100. Cf. Florida Laws of 1943, C. 21820, F.S.A. § 62.09.
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yond the possibility of improvement. If the Indiana courts
could rid themselves of the apparent obsession that for every
cause of action there is only one form of relief, progress could
be made. It should make no difference to a court through
which door a-litigant enters or leaves a court roora. The effort
to reconcile the Declaratory Judgments Act with the precon-
ceptions incident to executory relief and a "single title"-a
view advanced by no other court in this or any other country
-flowered in the strange dicta expressed in Brindley v.
Meara. So long as that case was in effect disregarded-be-
tween 1935 and 1942-the declaratory action, as we have seen,
was usefully applied in Indiana in a great varietyi of fact sit-
uations. As soon as it was revived, in 1942 and 1943, it prac-
tically brought to an end any further resort to thi, simple pro-
cedure and its service to the people of Indiana. A re-examina-
tion of the subject in the light of history and modern practice,
which would overrule Brindley v. Meara and it3 stultifying
effects, are indispensable to an efficient administration of
justice.
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